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Abstract
This paper examines the monitoring of illegal trade, and restrictions on the legal
trade, of secondhand goods. We assume that the home (foreign) country exports
(imports) secondhand goods both legally and illegally. We demonstrate that when
the trade restriction is nonbinding, and part of the legally imported goods serve
not as secondhand but as materials, an increase in the probability of monitoring
may increase expected foreign environmental damage. In contrast, when the trade
restriction is binding, if part of the legal imports is resold for material use, a stricter
trade restriction decreases expected foreign environmental damage. We also demon-
strate that when governments noncooperatively select monitoring probabilities, the
probability of foreign monitoring is necessarily higher than in the second-best sit-
uation. In this case, a commitment by the home government to its monitoring
probability improves welfare in both countries, and this commitment arises in the
extended game in which both governments choose the timing of the move in the
first stage and the monitoring probabilities in the second stage. Moreover, when
the foreign government chooses the level of the import quota on legal imports, it is
possible that the foreign trade restriction is stricter than the second-best level. In
such a case, any commitment by either government cannot simultaneously improve
the welfare of both countries.
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1 Introduction
The transboundary movement of secondhand goods from developed to developing coun-
tries has increased substantially in the last few decades.1 Importantly, imported second-
hand goods frequently contain hazardous substances, and upon dismantling and recycling
in importing/developing countries, often account for serious environmental pollution. Fur-
ther, in developing countries, the recycling sector is informal and usually unskilled-labor
intensive. Persons engaged in recycling in developing countries prefer pecuniary gains
to environmental protection and generally have little understanding of the toxicity of
hazardous substances. Therefore, they extract materials to acquire income without tak-
ing due care of the environment. Overall, although these countries gain some economic
benefit from importation, their governments have realized that the loss from environmen-
tal degradation dominates any economic benefit, and so aspire to reduce the unskilled
recycling of imported secondhand goods.
Theoretically, the best way to address this issue is to implement a form of Pigouvian tax
in each importing country. However, we typically observe illegal recycling and dumping in
many developing countries. Moreover, corruption is also sometimes serious in these same
countries. Therefore, it is usually difficult for developing countries to implement environ-
mental taxes effectively. In such cases, border measures, such as tariffs and import quotas,
can be effective second-best policies.2 In fact, having faced serious environmental damage
caused by imported secondhand goods, several developing countries have restricted their
trade, with some countries completely prohibiting the import of certain kinds of second-
hand products, such as electric appliances.3 International regulations, such as the Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their
Disposal, also stipulate trade restrictions on hazardous waste. Many secondhand goods,
such as used computers, contain toxic substances.4 Therefore, the Basel Convention may
also apply to the trade in secondhand goods. It is expected that even stricter regulation,
known as the Basel Convention Export Ban Amendment (or Basel Ban Amendment), will
1See Kellenberg (2010), Ray (2008), Shinkuma and Huong (2009), and Wong et al. (2007), among
others, for real-world situations concerning the trade in secondhand goods and waste.
2Copeland (1991) and Kinnaman and Yokoo (2011) referred to this same point and examined trade
policies as second-best policies.
3See the website for the Asian Network for Prevention of Illegal Transboundary Movement of Haz-
ardous Wastes for import controls on secondhand goods
(http://www.env.go.jp/en/recycle/asian net/Country Information/Import ctrl on 2ndhand.html).
4When exported for material use or dumping, they are classified as E-waste (Electronic and Electrical
Waste).
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come into effect in the next few years.5
However, because of two important problems specific to the trade in secondhand goods,
simple trade policies may not be able to reduce environmental pollution effectively. First,
a large amount of the trade in secondhand goods is illegal, often disguised as recycled
materials, which are not supposed to include hazardous substances. Although the export-
ing country should formally remove these hazardous substances prior to exportation, they
are often exported with the secondhand goods. Thus, to consider this problem, we need
to consider monitoring policies. In fact, the customs officers of exporting (importing)
countries inspect exports (imports) of materials/wastes and scrap, and we often observe
the ship-back of goods because the customs officers of importing countries discover ille-
gally traded products. However, because of imperfect monitoring, monitoring systems do
not work perfectly.6 Second, some legally imported secondhand goods, supposedly for
secondhand use, are also recycled for material use immediately after they are imported.
A troublesome point is that it is almost impossible for the governments of importing
countries to permit or prohibit the importation of secondhand goods according to their
purpose, i.e., secondhand use or material use. Therefore, the governments have to re-
strict both types of legal trade simultaneously if they want reduce the importation of
secondhand goods for material use.
In this paper, we examine monitoring policies on illegal trade and trade restrictions
on legal trade in secondhand goods. In particular, we focus on the effect of those poli-
cies on environmental damage in importing countries. In other words, assuming that we
should reduce environmental damage caused by imported secondhand goods in terms of
the welfare of the importing countries and global welfare, we investigate effective policies.
In addition, we examine the behavior of governments in choosing their monitoring prob-
abilities and the level of trade restrictions. In particular, our main research questions are
as follows: (a) should/do exporting/developed countries commit to stricter monitoring
activities; and (b) should international rules restrict the trade in secondhand goods more
severely?
There are three important features in our analysis. First, we consider an import quota
on secondhand goods as a trade-restricting measure. The reason is as follows. In reality,
importing countries usually prohibit older secondhand goods because they are difficult to
be resold for secondhand use, and are therefore likely to be used as materials. Governments
5See the website of the Basel Convention (http://www.basel.int/).
6See Shinkuma and Managi (2011) for a comprehensive analysis of waste and recycling.
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can then control the quantity of imports of secondhand goods by setting an age limit
whereby secondhand goods older than this limit cannot be legally imported. In this
paper, although we do not consider the age of secondhand goods explicitly, an import
quota in our paper has the same effect as the trade restriction with an age limit in the
real world. Because a simple tariff policy cannot distinguish between younger and older
secondhand goods, quotas can be effective tools.7
Second, technology and environmental management may progress in the future. We
also discount environmental damage in the future as we consider present values. Thus,
we assume that one unit of recycling in an importing country at present generates greater
environmental damage than one unit of recycling in the future. This implies that envi-
ronmental damage generated by one unit of illegal import is greater than that generated
by one unit of legal import for secondhand use because the former leads to recycling at
present while the latter leads to recycling in the future. Similarly, the recycling of legal
imports for material use generates greater environmental damage than does the recycling
of legal imports for secondhand use. This situation justifies policy that strictly restricts
secondhand goods for material use.
Third, developed countries benefit from the export of secondhand goods because they
can alleviate any scarcity of landfill. On the other hand, when customs in an importing
country detect illegal trade, exporters or the governments of exporting countries have to
bear ship-back costs, which are sometimes very high. Moreover, detection sometimes leads
to diplomatic issues, including the complete prohibition of trade in waste and scrap for a
certain period. The home government may also lose reputation, particularly when it joins
an international environmental agreement. Thus, we assume that exporting countries also
have an incentive to monitor the illegal export of secondhand goods.
In terms of related work, Cassing and Kuhn (2003) investigated the effect of trade
restrictions with waste trading. Copeland (1991) also examined trade restrictions in the
presence of illegal dumping. However, neither study distinguished between legal and
illegal trade, and therefore did not consider monitoring systems. Elsewhere, Clerides
and Hadjiyiannis (2008) and Kinnaman and Yokoo (2011) focused on the effect of trade
in durable goods, and demonstrated policies that achieve efficiency. However, they also
did not consider monitoring issues. As for monitoring, Harford (1978, 1987), Macho-
7Selective tariffs, which depend on the ages of secondhand goods can distinguish between younger and
older secondhand goods. Nevertheless, the theoretical effects of import quotas are the same as those of
tariffs because we assume perfectly competitive markets.
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Stadler and Pe´rez-Costirillo (2006), and Ino (2011) investigated enforcement policies when
environmental policies are imperfectly enforceable. However, to our best knowledge, few
studies have addressed strategic monitoring and trade restrictions in the context of the
trade in secondhand goods.
We demonstrate that when the trade restriction is nonbinding and part of the legally
imported goods serve not as secondhand but as materials, an increase in the probability of
monitoring may increase expected foreign environmental damage. Alternatively, when the
trade restriction is binding, if part of the legal imports (no legal import) is resold for ma-
terial use, a stricter trade restriction decreases (increases) expected foreign environmental
damage. We also demonstrate that when governments choose monitoring probabilities
noncooperatively, the foreign monitoring probability is necessarily higher than that in the
second-best situation. In such a case, the commitment to a monitoring probability by
the home government improves welfare in both countries, and this commitment arises in
an extended game in which both governments choose the timing of the move in the first
stage and the monitoring probabilities in the second stage. In addition, we consider the
situation in which the foreign government chooses not the monitoring probability, but
rather the level of an import quota on legal imports. It is then possible that the foreign
trade restriction is stricter than the second-best level. In such a case, any commitment
by either government cannot simultaneously improve welfare in both countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and le-
gal/illegal trade. Section 3 defines environmental damage and examines the effects of the
policy changes: namely, the monitoring probabilities and trade restrictions. Section 4
investigates the scenario in which both governments noncooperatively choose their mon-
itoring probabilities. Section 5 examines the choice of the level of trade restriction by
the government of an importing country. Section 6 extends the analysis to the case in
which home country recycling activities in the home country exist. Section 7 provides
some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Consider a developed country, referred to as the home country, and a developing country,
referred to as the foreign country. The home (foreign) country exports (imports) second-
hand goods (X). For simplicity, we assume there is no demand for (supply of) secondhand
goods in the home (foreign) country. Consumers in the home country use goods X for
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one period, after which they are discarded. Conversely, consumers in the foreign country
purchase secondhand goods and use them for one period, again discarding them after use.
2.1 Supply and Demand for Secondhand Goods
The supply of secondhand/discarded goods (X) in the home country is constant, denoted
by Xs. Collectors in the home country collect discarded goods from consumers. No
collector has market power. Collectors then have two alternatives: exporting the second-
hand goods to the foreign country either legally or illegally.8 These alternatives reflect
the following situation. In developed countries, recycling is usually very costly, whereas
in developing countries it is much less costly. This is partly because recycling is often
conducted using unskilled labor, even though this type of recycling can cause serious en-
vironmental damage. Home collectors then have an incentive to export secondhand goods
either legally or illegally. When exported illegally, secondhand goods are exported not for
secondhand use, but rather for material use. In such cases, hazardous substances are not
removed before exportation.9 They are thus disguised as recycled materials/waste and
scrap, which are formally supposed not to include hazardous substances. Foreign recy-
clers then extract materials from those goods. We also consider a scenario in which even
legally imported goods may be recycled directly for material use, which also generates
serious environmental pollution. Hereafter, we use exporters to represent home collectors.
When collectors export discarded goods legally, they have to repair the goods.10 The
marginal cost of repairing depends on the use of the secondhand good. The costs of repair
for some goods are low, while those for other very badly broken goods may be high. Those
costs may also depend on the skills of collectors. Thus, we define the marginal cost curve
of legal export for the entire collecting industry as follows:
MCl =MCl(Xl), MC
′
l > 0,
where Xl denotes the quantity of legal exports. The shipping cost is included in MCl.
11
8A third alternative, selling the secondhand goods to home recyclers, is examined in Section 6. Because
the results do not change qualitatively, for clarity, we exclude the alternative for home collectors to sell
secondhand goods to home recyclers in the main analysis.
9In general, secondhand goods are dismantled so they can be disguised as waste or scrap. Therefore,
it is difficult for importers to reassemble these goods for secondhand use.
10In reality, they have to do this because customs officers in the importing country often regard broken
goods that cannot be used as secondhand. In such cases, importation is not permitted.
11We do not explicitly describe the transactions between consumers and collectors. Implicitly, we
consider a situation in which the government sets a disposal fee on one unit of good X for consumers.
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When collectors export discarded goods illegally, they are obliged to disguise these
secondhand goods as materials. Thus, they have to pay a disguising cost, MCd, which is
constant. The shipping cost is also included in MCd.
There are two types of demand for secondhand goods in the foreign country. First,
consumers purchase and use these goods secondhand. Second, recyclers in the foreign
country buy secondhand goods, and make profits by extracting the materials from these
goods. The inverse demand curve of goods X for secondhand use in the foreign market
is given by:
pu = P u(Xu), P
u′ < 0, (1)
where Xu denotes the quantity of legal imports used secondhand. When a good X is
recycled for material use, it provides revenue, pm, which is exogenous.12 When pu > pm
holds, an additional unit of imports of secondhand goods is sold to a consumer. Therefore,
in equilibrium, pu ≥ pm holds. The equality holds when there are legal imports that are
directly recycled for material use. Hereafter, let Xl and Xm denote the total quantity of
legal imports and the quantity of legal imports which are directly recycled for material
use. Note that Xl = Xu +Xm holds.
2.2 Policies
We consider two kinds of policies. First, the foreign government may restrict the legal
import of secondhand goods. International trade regulations may also restrict export
of these goods. The purpose of this policy is to reduce the import for material use.
In this paper, we consider an import quota on legal imports, denoted by X¯l. In the real
world, importing countries of secondhand goods often ban the import of older secondhand
goods. This is because their secondhand prices are lower than relatively newer secondhand
goods, and therefore the older goods are more likely to be recycled following importation.
Although we do not explicitly consider the age of the secondhand goods, the effects
of import quotas in our theoretical analysis can be applied to the impact of a trade
prohibition on older secondhand goods in the real world.13
Consumers then have an incentive to pay a collection fee to collectors if the collection fee is at most equal
to the disposal fee.
12This assumption implies that the material market is competitive and demand is elastic. Moreover, we
implicitly consider that the foreign recycling sector is an informal sector and that foreign recyclers receive
a subsistence wage. Therefore, pm more precisely denotes the price of the materials less the subsistence
wage.
13The home government is also able to set an export restriction. However, importing countries and/or
international environmental agreements usually attempt to set stricter restrictions. This is because
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Second, both the home and foreign governments monitor illegal trade. Because ille-
gal exports are disguised as recycled materials, governments inspect all material trade.
However, customs officers may not be able to identify illegal trade with certainty. Alter-
natively, they may intentionally overlook any illegal trade. We let αi (i = h, f) denote
the monitoring probability; more precisely, the product of the probability of monitoring
and identifiability. The governments then choose the level of αi.
It is costly for governments to monitor exports/imports. Moreover, when a government
identifies goods arising from illegal trade, it must temporarily retain the goods, handing
them back to the home collectors. In addition, the foreign government makes collectors
ship these goods back to the home country. Hence, the expected operating cost of the
monitoring system increases with the expected amount of identified illegal trade. The
expected amount also depends on the strictness of the import quota. Thus, the expected
operating cost of the monitoring system is:
E[CG,i] = E[CG,i(αi, X¯l)], i = h, f. (2)
Throughout the paper, the combinations of E and square brackets denote expected values.
We set up the following assumption on the shape of this cost function.
Assumption 1
∂E[CG,i]
∂αi
> 0,
∂2E[CG,i]
∂α2i
> 0,
∂E[CG,i]
∂αj
= 0,
∂E[CG,i]
∂X¯l
< 0,
∂2E[CG,i]
∂X¯2l
> 0,
∂2E[CG,i]
∂αi∂X¯l
< 0,
where i, j = h, f, i 6= j.
The first two inequalities in the first line are intuitive. The total quantity of traded
materials, which are classified as waste and scrap according to trade classifications, is
very large.14 Therefore, the quantity of secondhand goods monitored does not affect the
total monitoring cost. Thus, the probability of home (foreign) monitoring does not affect
the foreign (home) monitoring cost: see the third equality in the first line. A laxer trade
importing countries suffer most from any environmental/health damage arising from pollution caused by
the imported secondhand goods. In such a case, exporting countries respect the restrictions set by the
importing countries. Thus, we focus on trade restrictions set by the importing countries and through
international trade regulation.
14An example of a trade classification is the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System
(HS) for tariff nomenclature.
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restriction, which implies a larger X¯l, then leads to a lower monitoring cost because the
expected amount of identified illegal trade decreases: see the three inequalities in the
second line.
The fine set by each government is Fh and Ff , respectively.
15 In this model, we assume
these fines are exogenous. The reason for this is that the level of the fine for the illegal
export/import should accord with fines for other types of illegal activity. Thus, we exclude
an infinitely large fine.16
2.3 Legal Trade, Illegal Trade, and Recycling in the Home Coun-
try
Assuming that the supply of discarded goods in the home country is sufficiently large such
that illegal trade necessarily exists, we now consider the determination of the quantities
of legal and illegal imports of the secondhand goods. We assume the following situation.
There are many exporters (foreign brokers) in the home (foreign) country. We refer to a
foreign broker as an importer. One importer and one exporter make a deal to trade each
unit of secondhand goods. The two stakeholders divide the net expected profit from the
deal. The ratio that the exporter (importer) gains is β (1− β), where 0 < β < 1.17
First, by taking into consideration monitoring by both the home and foreign countries,
we redefine the cost of illegal export. This is because the exporter or the importer must
pay the fine and ship-back cost associated with the discovery of illegal trade. Thus, the
expected marginal cost of illegal export (E[Cil]) is greater than MCd in the presence of
monitoring:
E[Cil] =MCd + αhFh + αf (1− αh)(Ff + λ),
where λ denotes the ship-back cost.18 We set up the following assumption.
Assumption 2 ∂E[Cil]/∂αh > 0, i.e., Fh − αf (Ff + λ) > 0.
15Not only importing countries but also exporting countries usually set fines. For exam-
ple, in Japan, the Waste Disposal and Public Cleaning Law stipulates fines for the illegal ex-
port of secondhand goods and waste. See the website for the Ministry of the Environment
(http://www.env.go.jp/en/laws/recycle/index.html).
16The possibility of mistaken arrest also provides a basis for the argument that fines should not be
infinitely large.
17We do not delve into the details concerning the problem of contracts between exporters and importers.
18As noted in the introduction and will be noted in Section 4, we assume the existence of an additional
cost relating to detection, which is borne by the home government. Thus, the home government has an
incentive to monitor illegal exports.
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This assumption implies that an increase in the home identifying probability increases
the expected cost of illegal export.
Some of secondhand goods that exporters attempt to export illegally are identified
by customs officers of both countries and shipped them back to the home country. We
assume that these shipped back goods are recycled in the home country. Let X˜il and X
∗
il
denote the quantity of discarded goods that home recyclers attempt to export illegally
and the realized quantity of illegal exports, respectively. It then holds that:
E[X∗il] = (1− αh)(1− αf )X˜il. (3)
Moreover, total expected import of discarded goods (E[IM ]) is given by
E[IM∗] = Xl + E[X∗il].
In addition, it holds that
Xs = Xl + X˜il = Xl +X
∗
il +Xr,
where Xr denotes the quantity of discarded goods that are recycled in the home country.
There are four possible cases. In the first case, an import quota is binding, and part
of the legally imported secondhand goods is resold for material use (see Figure 1 (a)).
In this case, Xl = X¯l and p
m − MCl(X¯l) > (1 − αh)(1 − αf )pm − E[Cil] hold. In
the second case, an import quota is also binding. Contrary to the first case, no legally
imported secondhand goods are resold for material use (see Figure 1 (b)). Xl = X¯l and
P u(X¯l) − MCl(X¯l) > (1 − αh)(1 − αf )pm − E[Cil] hold. In the third case, the trade
restriction is nonbinding, and part of the legally imported secondhand goods is resold
for material use (see Figure 1 (c)). “Nonbinding” implies either that there is no import
quota, or that there is an international regulation, but it is too lax. The quantity of legal
imports is determined such that
pm −MCl(Xl) = (1− αh)(1− αf )pm − E[Cil] (4)
holds. In the fourth case, the trade restriction is nonbinding. Contrary to the third case,
no legally imported secondhand goods are resold for material use (see Figure 1 (d)). The
quantity of legal imports is determined such that
P u(Xl)−MCl(Xl) = (1− αh)(1− αf )pm − E[Cil] (5)
holds.
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3 Foreign Environmental Damage
The recycling of secondhand goods in the foreign country generates environmental pollu-
tion. When imported goods are for secondhand use, they will be recycled in the future.
Technology and environmental management may progress in the future. As we consider
present values, we discount the environmental damage generated in the future. There-
fore, we assume that the environmental damage from the recycling of (a) illegal imports
(Xil) and (b) legal imports for material use (Xm) is greater than that of legal imports for
secondhand use (Xu): one unit of recycling in the foreign country at present generates
µMf units of environmental damage, while that in the future generates µ
S
f units of envi-
ronmental damage, where µMf > µ
S
f . Then, the foreign expected environmental damage
is defined as
E[ef ] = µ
M
f · (E[X∗il] +Xm) + µSf ·Xu. (6)
Recycling activity in the home country is costly, but it does not generate environmental
damage as we assume its proper management. However, the home country faces the
problem of a scarcity of landfills. An increase in recycling activity in the home country
thus leads to an increase in the residual disposed of into landfills. Thus, recycling in the
home country generates an external cost. Assuming one unit of recycling in the home
country generates µh units of external cost, the expected cost related to home recycling
is defined as
E[eh] = µh · (Xs − E[IM∗]).
3.1 Policy Effects
We now investigate whether monitoring or an import quota can decrease foreign environ-
mental damage.
First, we examine the effect of an increase in the probability of monitoring. In terms
of importers and exporters, αh and αf have similar effects. Thus, we focus on αh. When
an import quota is binding, a change in the monitoring probability does not affect the
quantities of legal imports for both secondhand and material use, which also implies that
X˜il does not change. Then, from (3), we obtain that
∂E[X∗il]
∂αh
= −(1− αf )X˜il.
The quantity of realized illegal imports decreases, because an increase in the monitoring
probability increases the quantity of identified illegal trade.
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When an import quota is nonbinding, the monitoring probability affects the quantity
of legal imports. When part of the legal imports is recycled for material use (Figure 1
(c)), from (4) and Assumption 2, we obtain that
dXm
dαh
=
(1− αf )pm + ∂E[Cil]∂αh
MC ′l(Xl)
> 0.
An increase in monitoring probability increases the expected cost of illegal trade. The
costs of repair for some secondhand goods then become smaller than the expected cost of
illegal trade. Thus, the quantity of legal trade for material use increases.
Because X˜il = Xs −Xl and because Xu does not change, it also holds that
dX˜il
dαh
= −dXm
dαh
< 0,
dE[X∗il]
dαh
= −(1− αf )X˜il + (1− αh)(1− αf )dX˜il
dαh
< 0. (7)
Whether the total expected quantity of imports for material use (Xm+E[X
∗
il]) increases or
decreases depends on the supply of secondhand goods, the value of the fines, the shape of
the marginal repair cost curve, the level of αh, and the ship-back cost. More precisely, two
effects arise. First, the trade of secondhand goods for material use partly changes from
illegal to legal trade. In this respect, the quantity of imports for material use increases
because the foreign government cannot ship them back when legally imported. Second,
an increase in monitoring probability increases the probability of identifying illegal trade.
In this respect, the quantity of imports for recycling decreases. In total, the former effect
may dominate the latter.
When no legal imports are recycled for material use (Figure 1 (d)), from (5), we obtain
that
dXu
dαh
=
dXl
dαh
= −(1− αf )p
m + ∂E[Cil]
∂αh
pu′(Xl)−MC ′l(Xl)
> 0.
Note that (7) and dXu/dαh = −dX˜il/dαh also hold in this case. Therefore, the amount
of the increase in legal imports for secondhand use is smaller than the amount of the
decrease in illegal imports. Because µSf < µ
M
f , foreign environmental damage necessarily
decreases.
Proposition 1
An increase in monitoring probability (αi, i = h, f) necessarily decreases expected foreign
environmental damage (a) when an import quota is binding, or (b) when an import quota
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is nonbinding and no legal imports are used for materials. On the other hand, when a
trade restriction is nonbinding and part of the legal imports are for use as materials, an
increase in the monitoring probability may increase the expected foreign environmental
damage.
Next, we examine the effect of a stricter trade restriction: a decrease in X¯l. It is
obvious that when an import quota is nonbinding, a stricter trade restriction does not
affect the quantity of legal imports or the expected quantity of illegal imports. There is
no effect on the quantity of goods for secondhand use and as materials.
On the other hand, when an import quota is binding, ∂Xl/∂X¯l > 0 holds.
Lemma 1
Suppose that an import quota is binding. Then, given the monitoring probabilities of
both countries, a stricter trade restriction necessarily decreases (increases) the quantity
of legal (illegal) trade.
A stricter trade restriction implies a smaller X¯l. Lemma 1 implies that part of the imports
for material use change from legal to illegal trade. When a part of legal imports is resold
for material use, a stricter trade restriction leads to a decrease in imports for material use.
The reason is that when discarded goods are imported legally for material use, customs
officers cannot distinguish goods for material use from those for secondhand use. On the
other hand, when discarded goods are imported illegally, foreign customs officers may be
able to identify these goods and ship them back to the home country. Conversely, when
no legal imports are for materials, a stricter trade restriction leads to an increase in the
imports for material use. This is because part of the imports change from legal trade
for secondhand use to illegal trade for material use. Consequently, the following result is
established.
Proposition 2
When an import quota is binding, if part of the legal imports (no legal import) is resold
for material use, a stricter trade restriction decreases (increases) expected foreign envi-
ronmental damage.
We note three important policy implications. First, when an import quota is nonbind-
ing, an increase in the monitoring probability may worsen foreign environmental damage
because the quantity of imports for material use increases. Interestingly, the original pur-
pose of monitoring is to decrease foreign environmental damage. However, it may give rise
13
to the opposite effect. In such a case, the foreign government does not have an incentive
to increase the probability of monitoring. In other words, for the foreign government to
have an incentive to monitor illegal imports to mitigate foreign environmental damage
caused by the recycling of imported secondhand goods, there may be a need for a binding
import quota.
Second, the smaller is αi (i = h, f), the larger the gains from illegal trade, and accord-
ingly, the smaller the quantity of legal trade. This implies that a decrease in αi increases
the possibility that the trade restriction is nonbinding, given X¯l. Therefore, the trade
restriction cannot be effective when monitoring systems do not function well. Thus, we
can say that monitoring activities and trade restrictions are complements.
Third, in the literature when illegal activities cannot be punished with certainty, a
trade restriction is justified to achieve the second-best outcome.19 On the other hand, in
the present case, because both legal and illegal imports generate environmental damage,
a trade restriction may induce an increase in environmental damage. Therefore, a trade
restriction is not always justified.
4 Noncooperative Choices of Monitoring Probabili-
ties
We have obtained that a binding import quota can be important such that the foreign
government has an incentive to monitor illegal trade when part of the legal imports is
resold to foreign recyclers for material use. In this section, assuming that the level of
trade restriction (X¯l) is exogenous, we consider the situation in which the governments
choose the monitoring probabilities (αi (i = h, f)) to maximize the welfare of their own
countries. The exogeneity of the import quota suggests that it is part of the stipulations
of an international environmental agreement. For clarity of the analysis and applicability
to real-world situations, we focus on the case in which an import quota is binding, and
part of the legally imported goods go directly into the recycling process of the foreign
country for material use (Xm > 0, see Figure 1 (a)).
Home welfare is defined as the sum of the net profits of exporters and government
revenue less the costs for the government arising from the identification of illegal trade
19For example, see Copeland (1991).
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(T ), the costs relating to home recycling, and the monitoring cost:
E[Wh] = β ·
(
pmX¯l −
∫ X¯l
0
MCl(y)dy
)
+ β · {(1− αh)(1− αf )pm − E[Cil]} · X˜il
+αhFhX˜l − αf (1− αh)TX˜il − µh · (αh + αf − αhαf )X˜il − E[CG,h]. (8)
Note that X˜il = Xs−X¯l. Moreover, T is the cost for the home government of the detection
of illegal exports by the foreign government. Sometimes detection leads to diplomatic
actions including the complete ban of waste and scrap for a certain period. The home
government may also lose reputation, particularly when it is part of an international
environmental agreement. Because this is a form of external cost, it is not considered by
the exporter.
Foreign welfare is defined as the sum of consumer surplus from secondhand use (CSu),
the net profits of importers, and government revenue less the environmental damage and
the monitoring cost:
E[Wf ] = CSu + (1− β) ·
(
pmX¯l −
∫ X¯l
0
MCl(y)dy
)
+(1− β) · {(1− αh)(1− αf )pm − E[Cil]} · X˜il + αf (1− αh)FfX˜il
−µMf ·
{
(1− αh)(1− αf )X˜il + X¯l −Xu
}
− µSfXu − E[CG,f ]. (9)
4.1 Monitoring Game
Because the seriousness of the environmental damage arising from recycling goods X for
material use differs from that when they are used secondhand, for the first-best situation
to be achieved, the markets must be segmented according to their purpose for use. In
other words, the price of goods for secondhand use should differ from that for recycling.
However, in the situation we focus on for legally traded goods, it is difficult for customs
officers to distinguish between secondhand goods for secondhand use and those for material
use. We assume that in the foreign country these markets are integrated. Therefore, we
consider that the second-best situation is the benchmark given the integration of these
markets. Because the level of trade restriction is exogenous, the first-order conditions
(FOCs) for the second-best situation are given by
∂(E[Wh] + E[Wf ])
∂αh
= 0,
∂(E[Wh] + E[Wf ])
∂αf
= 0.
We regard the combination of monitoring probabilities that satisfies the above FOCs as a
cooperative equilibrium. We also assume that the second-order conditions (SOCs) hold.
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By contrast, when each government selects its monitoring probability noncooperatively,
from (8) and (9), the FOCs are
∂E[Wh]
∂αh
= −βX˜il · {(1− αf )pm + Fh − αf (Ff + λ)}+ (Fh + αfT )X˜il
−µh · (1− αf )X˜il − ∂E[CG,h]
∂αh
= 0, (10)
∂E[Wf ]
∂αf
= −(1− β)(1− αh)(pm + Ff + λ)X˜il
+(1− αh)(Ff + µf )X˜il − ∂E[CG,f ]
∂αf
= 0. (11)
For the home country, an increase in its own monitoring probability decreases the sur-
plus from the export of secondhand goods, increases home recycling, and increases the
monitoring cost. At the same time, it can avoid fines imposed by the foreign government
and the costs related to detection/ship-back. For the foreign country, an increase in its
own monitoring probability decreases the surplus from the import of secondhand goods
and increases the monitoring cost. It also increases the revenue from fines and decreases
environmental damage.
We let αNi (i = h, f) denote the equilibrium probabilities in the noncooperative Nash
equilibrium.20 We refer to this equilibrium as the simultaneous move equilibrium. In the
following, we focus on the case in which the home government chooses a positive amount
of monitoring probability. The home government can save the external cost related to the
identification of illegal trade by foreign customs and gain government revenue by increasing
the monitoring probability. Thus, it follows from (10) that the home government is likely
to choose a positive monitoring probability (a) unless αf and/or T are very small and (b)
unless µh is large.
We obtain the following partial derivatives:
∂E[Wh]
∂αf
= −β · (1− αh)(pm + Ff + λ)X˜il
−(1− αh)(T + µh)X˜il
< 0. (12)
20From Assumption 1, and Equations (10) and (11), we obtain
∂2E[Wi]
∂α2i
= −∂
2E[CG,i]
∂α2h
< 0, i = h, f.
We will show in (14) and (15), ∂2E[Wh]/∂αh∂αf > 0 and ∂2E[Wf ]/∂αh∂αf < 0 hold. Thus, the SOCs
are satisfied.
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∂E[Wf ]
∂αh
= −(1− β) {(1− αf )pm + Fh − αf (Ff + λ)} X˜il
−αfFfX˜il + µf · (1− αf )X˜il. (13)
Thus, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3
In the simultaneous move equilibrium, the foreign monitoring probability is necessarily
higher than in the second-best situation. Conversely, whether the home monitoring prob-
ability is higher than that in the second-best situation is generally ambiguous. It is,
however, likely that the home monitoring probability is lower (higher) than that in the
second-best situation, if (a) foreign environmental damage is serious (not serious) and (b)
the ratio of the net profits gained by importers are small (large).
An increase in the foreign monitoring probability decreases the realized imports for ma-
terial use and increases the external cost related to ship-back and recycling in the home
country. Both of these effects reduce home welfare. Because the foreign government does
not take into consideration the loss of the home country, the foreign monitoring proba-
bility in the simultaneous move equilibrium is necessarily higher than in the second-best
situation. An increase in the home monitoring probability also decreases the realized
imports for material use. This decrease gives rise to three effects: first, the pecuniary
benefit from illegal imports decreases; second, the foreign government revenue decreases;
and third, foreign environmental damage falls. Thus, when the third effect dominates the
sum of the first two effects, the home monitoring probability in the simultaneous move
equilibrium is lower than that in the second-best situation.
4.2 Commitment
Given the level of trade restriction, can commitment by either government improve the
welfare of both countries? First, we note the following second partial derivative.
∂2E[Wh]
∂αh∂αf
= β · (pm + Ff + λ)X˜il + (T + µh)X˜il > 0. (14)
From (11), we also obtain that
∂2E[Wf ]
∂αh∂αf
= (1− β) · (pm + Ff + λ)X˜il − (Ff + µf )X˜il < 0. (15)
An increase in the foreign monitoring probability increases the possibility of ship-back.
The home government can avoid this possibility of ship-back by increasing its own moni-
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toring probability. Moreover, a marginal decrease in the surplus from the export of sec-
ondhand goods becomes smaller. Thus, the home government increases the monitoring
probability in response to an increase in the foreign monitoring probability (see (14)).
By contrast, recalling that it is costly to monitor material trade, the foreign govern-
ment can save the monitoring cost when the home government increases its monitoring
probability. In this respect, the foreign government has an incentive to decrease its mon-
itoring probability in response to an increase in the home monitoring probability. On the
other hand, as the home monitoring probability becomes smaller, the marginal decrease
in the surplus from the import of secondhand goods becomes smaller. In this respect, the
foreign government has an incentive to increase its monitoring probability in response to
an increase in the home monitoring probability. Equation (15) reveals that the former
effect necessarily dominates the latter. Thus, the foreign government decreases its mon-
itoring probability in response to an increase in the home monitoring probability. The
situation in the case of ∂E[Wf ]/∂αh > 0 ( ∂E[Wf ]/∂αh < 0) is shown in Figure 2 (a) (2
(b)). Ri (i = h, f) and Ii (i = h, f) denote the reaction function and social indifference
curve, respectively.
Suppose that ∂E[Wf ]/∂αh > 0, and consider the situation in which the home govern-
ment commits itself to a certain monitoring probability, i.e., the home (foreign) govern-
ment is the leader (follower) in determining the monitoring probabilities. In this case,
Point A in Figure 2 (a) depicts the equilibrium. It is clear that the welfare of both
countries improves when compared with those in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium.
Let us define the extended game as follows. both governments choose the timings of
moves in the first stage, and their own monitoring probabilities in the second stage. Thne,
as proved by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990, Theorem V), the home government moves first
and the foreign government moves second in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in
the extended game between both governments: that is, the governments choose the timing
of the moves in the first stage and the monitoring probabilities in the second stage.
Proposition 4
Suppose that ∂E[Wf ]/∂αh > 0. A commitment of monitoring probability by the home
government then improves the welfare of both countries compared with those in the si-
multaneous move equilibrium. Moreover, in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the
extended game, the home (foreign) government moves first (second), which implies that
the home government chooses to make a commitment.
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Proposition 4 provides an interesting policy implication. That is, a binding import quota
not only gives the foreign government an incentive to monitor the illegal import of second-
hand goods, but also generates a Pareto superior set of monitoring probabilities compared
with those in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium through the choice of the timing of
moves.
In the case of ∂E[Wf ]/∂αh < 0, the foreign government chooses to make a commitment
in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the extended game. In other words, the foreign
(home) government becomes a leader (follower). Similar to the case of ∂E[Wf ]/∂αh > 0,
a Pareto superior set of monitoring probabilities compared with those in the simultaneous
move equilibrium arises, although the situation in which both monitoring probabilities in
the simultaneous move equilibrium are higher than the second-best probabilities seems to
be rather less realistic.
5 The Choice of Trade Restriction by the Importing
Country
Let us now turn to the scenario where the foreign monitoring probability has an upper
limit: αf = α¯f . For example, slow decision-making processes in bureaucratic organizations
may make it difficult for the foreign government to increase its monitoring probability in
the short run because the policy change also requires changes in personnel. In this case,
the foreign government may choose the level of trade restriction to maximize its own
welfare, at least in the short run. On the other hand, and similar to the results in the
previous section, the home government chooses its monitoring probability, and part of the
legal imports are resold to foreign recyclers for material use.
In a noncooperative Nash equilibrium, the FOC for the home government is the same
as (10), while the FOC for the foreign government is given by
∂E[Wf ]
∂X¯l
= (1− β)(pm −MCl(X¯l))− (1− β) · {(1− αh)(1− αf )pm − E[Cil]}
−αf (1− αh)Ff − µf · (αh + αf − αhαf )− ∂E[CG,f ]
∂X¯l
= 0.
We assume that the SOCs and stability condition are satisfied.
For the level of trade restriction, we obtain that
∂E[Wh]
∂X¯l
= β · (pm −MCl(X¯l))− β · {(1− αh)(1− αf )pm − E[Cil]}
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−αhFh + αf (1− αh)T + µh(αh + αf − αhαf )− ∂E[CG,h]
∂X¯l
. (16)
pm −MCl(X¯l) > (1 − αh)(1 − αf )pm − E[Cil] holds when an import quota is binding.
Thus, from Assumption 1, the following result is obtained.
Proposition 5
In the simultaneous move equilibrium, the foreign trade restriction is stricter than in the
second-best situation if the expected amount of punishment by the home government
is smaller than the sum of the expected government cost with realized ship-back and
expected home environmental damage. On the other hand, it is likely that the home
monitoring probability is higher than that in the second-best situation if (a) the foreign
environmental damage is serious, and (b) the ratio of the net profits gained by importers
are small.
Similar to the previous section, focusing on the case of ∂E[Wf ]/∂αh > 0, we consider
the commitment problem. Using (10) and Assumption 2, we obtain
∂2E[Wh]
∂X¯l∂αh
= β · {(1− αf )pm + Fh − αf (Ff + λ)} − Fh − αfT + µh(1− αf ) < 0. (17)
The intuition is the same as in the monitoring game: a stricter trade restriction increases
the possibility of ship-back. The home government can avoid ship-back by increasing its
own monitoring probability.21 Moreover, from (13), we obtain
∂2E[Wf ]
∂αh∂X¯l
= (1− β) · {(1− αf )pm + Fh − αf (Ff + λ)}+ αfFf − µf · (1− αf ) < 0. (18)
Contrary to the case of the monitoring game, the foreign government chooses a stricter
trade restriction in response to a higher home monitoring probability. An increase in
the home monitoring probability means that realized illegal imports decrease given the
foreign monitoring probability. Therefore, the foreign government can decrease the import
of secondhand goods for material use more effectively through stricter trade restrictions
on legal imports. Note that strategic complements hold for both governments.22
The case in which ∂E[Wh]/∂X¯l > 0 is shown in Figure 3 (a). In this case, a commitment
by either government or an international agreement on a stricter trade restriction cannot
simultaneously improve the welfare of both countries. This situation lies in sharp contrast
21We may recall that a smaller X¯l implies a stricter trade restriction.
22Because a smaller X¯l implies a stricter trade restriction, the inequalities of (17) and (18) implies
strategic complements.
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to the case in which the foreign government chooses its monitoring probability. To achieve
a Pareto superior situation, the trade restriction on legal imports should be laxer and the
home monitoring probability should be higher as compared with those in the simultaneous
move equilibrium. Moreover, as proved by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990, Theorem V), both
governments move simultaneously, even in the extended game. In this situation, a free
hand should not be given to an importing country to set an import quota noncooperatively.
The case in which ∂E[Wh]/∂X¯l < 0 is shown in Figure 3 (b). In this case, a com-
mitment by either government can simultaneously improve the welfare of both countries.
In addition, the extended game has multiple equilibria. In other words, it is important
for the home (or foreign) government to commit to the second-best level of monitoring
probability (or import quota).
6 Recycling in the Home Country
We have thus far considered that home collectors export discarded goods legally or ille-
gally. However, they may have yet another alternative: namely, selling discarded goods
to home recyclers. Even if we consider this scenario, we obtain similar results about the
policy effects on foreign environmental damage. Similar to previous sections, we assume
that the supply of discarded goods is sufficiently large such that illegal exports exist.
Let us define the marginal cost curve for recycling in the home country:
MCr =MCr(Xr), MC
′
r > 0.
Then, in addition to the conditions described in Subsection 2.3 for the possible four cases,
such as (4) and (5), the following condition holds:
(1− αh)(1− αf )pm − E[Cil] = pm −MCr(X˜r),
where X˜r denotes the quantity of discarded goods that home collectors determine to sell
them to home recyclers: X˜r = Xs−Xl− X˜il. This condition depends on neither whether
the trade restriction is binding nor whether a part of any legal imports is resold to foreign
recyclers. Because part of the illegal exports is shipped back to the home country, the
expected quantity of total home recycling is:
E[X∗r ] = X˜r + (αh + αf − αhαf )X˜il.
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The effect of a higher home monitoring probability on X˜r is given by
dX˜r
dαh
=
(1− αf )pm − ∂E[Cil]∂αh
MC ′r
> 0.
This implies that when the home government increases its monitoring probability, not only
the quantity of legal imports, but also the sales of discarded goods directly from home
collectors to home recyclers increase. The increase in sales to home recyclers reduces
foreign environmental damage. Thus, the possibility that a higher monitoring probability
accounts for more serious foreign environmental damage is lower compared with the case
without the alternative of selling discarded goods to home recyclers. However, even for
the present case, Propositions 1 and 2 hold.
When both the home and foreign governments choose their own monitoring probabil-
ities given the level of trade restriction, the slope of the reaction function of the home
government is not necessarily positive. The reason is that an increase in the foreign moni-
toring probability increases the recycling cost in the home country. Because the marginal
recycling cost also increases, an increase in the home monitoring probability becomes more
costly. Then, the home government may decrease its monitoring probability in response
to an increase in the foreign monitoring probability.
When the slope of the reaction function of the home government is negative, if ∂E[Wf ]/∂αh >
0, multiple equilibria exist in the extended game. This means that the following situation
can arise: the home (foreign) government is a leader (follower) in the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium achieves a Pareto superior set of monitoring proba-
bilities compared with that in the simultaneous move equilibrium.
7 Conclusion
By assuming that the home (foreign) country exports (imports) secondhand goods, we
examined monitoring policies on the illegal trade and restrictions on the legal trade in sec-
ondhand goods. We focused on the level of environmental damage in importing countries.
We also investigated the behavior of both governments in choosing their own monitoring
probabilities and the level of trade restrictions.
First, we demonstrated that when the trade restriction is nonbinding and part of any
legally imported goods serve as materials, an increase in monitoring probability may
increase expected foreign environmental damage. Moreover, when the trade restriction is
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binding, if part of the legal imports (no legal import) is resold for material use, a stricter
trade restriction decreases (increases) expected foreign environmental damage.
Second, we found that when governments choose their monitoring probabilities non-
cooperatively, the foreign monitoring probability is necessarily higher than that in the
second-best situation. In this case, a commitment to a monitoring probability by the
home government improves welfare in both countries, and this commitment arises in the
extended game in which both governments choose the timing of their move in the first
stage and their monitoring probabilities in the second stage. The reason is that the home
government increases its monitoring probability in response to an increase in the foreign
monitoring probability.
Third, we consider the situation in which the foreign government chooses not the
monitoring probability, but rather the level of an import quota on legal imports. It is
possible that the foreign trade restriction is stricter than the second-best level. In such
a case, any commitment by either government cannot simultaneously improve welfare in
both countries.
Finally, the responses for our initial research questions are as follows. First, exporting
countries should commit to stricter monitoring probabilities if the present situation ap-
pears to correspond to the simultaneous move equilibrium. In the presence of a binding
trade restriction, a Pareto superior situation will then arise. Second, when importing
countries choose the level of trade restriction, it is possible that they are too strict. In
such a case, free hands should not be given to importing countries to set import quotas.
International trade organizations should set the level of any trade restriction.
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 Figure 1 (a): The case of binding trade restriction when a part of legal imports are resold to 
foreign recyclers for material use. 
 
 
Figure 1 (b): The case of binding trade restriction when no legally traded imports are 
resold to foreign recyclers. 
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Figure 1 (c): The case of non-binding trade restriction when a part of legal imports are 
resold to foreign recyclers for material use. 
 
 
Figure 1 (d): The case of non-binding trade restriction when no legally traded imports are 
resold to foreign recyclers. 
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            Figure 2(a) : Equilibrium in the monitoring game when   0 hfWE   
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         Figure 3 (a): The choice of trade restriction by the foreign government when 
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        Figure 3 (b): The choice of trade restriction by the foreign government when 
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